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IN T H E S U P R E M E

COURT

OF T H E S T A T E OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-R espondent,
Case No.
-v-

13889

GALVESTON SONNY SCOTT, .
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

•'•".'

The appellant, Galveston Sonny Scott, herein appeals from his
conviction of the crime of manslaughter in the Third Judicial District
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Jay E.
Banks presiding.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

'•

The jury impaneled in the matter found the defendant,guilty of
the crime of manslaughter,' a felony of the second degree, on October 26,
1974. Subsequently, the trial court sentenced appellant to serve an
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indeterminate term in the Utah State Prison of from one to fifteen years,
as provided by law.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
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Appellant seeks reversal of the verdict and judgment of the trial
court and remand of the matter for a new trial,

/

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On January 1, 1974, at approximately 1:50 a . m . , the appellant
herein, accompanied by a friend, one Binky Coleman, entered the Beehive
Lodge of Elks at 248 West South Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah. Shortly
after appellant entered the Lodge, an altercation ensued between appellant
and his companion and two other individuals, one Gray and one "Blood. "
Numerous shots were exchanged in the altercation and the upshot of the
encounter was that two persons, David Allen Gray and Phillip Dawson,
were killed.
Conflicting testimony was adduced at trial regarding the facts and
circumstances surrounding the shooting. Defendant produced at trial
numerous witnesses supportive of defendants contention that he acted in
self-defense.

At trial, testimony was had to the effect that (A) the individuals

involved in the shootout with the appellant had earlier threatened appellant
at his home while armed with weapons in a dispute involving some rings
allegedly owned by the decedent David Allen Gray (Tr. 359); (B) that the
individuals involved in the shootout with appellant had previously assaulted

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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appellant on the Saturday night preceding the shootout, that they had, used
weapons on that occasion, and that numerous shots were exchanged at that
time (Tr. 311-313, 321, 380-383); and (C) that on the occasion of the commission of the crime of which defendant-appellant was convicted, the other
individuals involved had opened fire on the defendant precedent to defendant
shooting back, and that the defendant had returned the fire in self-defense
(Tr. 281, 300, 302, 333-334, 338, 372).
During the course of trial, counsel for the defendant moved the
trial court to permit the jury to view the crime scene. The trial court
took the matter under advisement. (Tr. 266.) At a later juncture,
subsequent to both parties having rested their respective cases, defendant's
counsel renewed the motion to view the crime scene. The motion was
.

j

• • • • • . • •

.

•

•

•

'

"

•

,.

'.'

'

granted by the court with the proviso that neither the defendant nor
counsel for the defendant nor any other persons other than the jurors and
the deputies who accompanied them could be in attendance upon the viewing.
Defendants counsel duly excepted to the court's ruling upon grounds that
the viewing of the crime scene was a critical stage of the prosecution and,
therefore, the defendant, counsel, and other court personnel should be
in attendance, x (Tr. 434-435.)
At a later juncture in the trial, in the course of defense counsel's
summation, counsel directed the jury's attention to the fact that the other
individuals involved in the shootout at the Beehive Elk's Lodge, the
• • • " ' • V '

•'"••/'
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,
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'

decedent David Allen Gray and one "Blood, " had earlier assaulted the
appellant and a companion with a rifle. At that juncture, counsel was
attempting to point out to the jury that even though appellant had sought
out the individuals who had earlier assaulted him, the defendant acted in
self-defense in so doing in response to an earlier incident in which
appellant's life had been placed in jeopardy. At this point the court
interrupted counsel to advise counsel and the jury that such defense was
unavailable because the "agressor" for the purpose of defining the viability of a defense of self-defense is determined at the time of the commission of the offense charged. The court, by its actions, essentially
foreclosed that area of comment by counsel. (Tr. 488-489.)
Subsequent to both parties having rested their respective cases,
the jury retired to consider the matter. Upon deliberation, the jury
returned a verdict against defendant-appellant of guilty on one count of
Criminal Homicide -- Manslaughter, and judgment was duly entered by
the trial court accordingly. (Tr. 544.) From that verdict and judgment
the defendant-appellant brings this appeal.
] ARGUMENT
'

,

POINT I

r

v.- ;

••/' •/•••,; . :;•••';• V

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT NEITHER
DEFENDANT, HIS COUNSEL, NOR NECESSARY COURT
PERSONNEL COULD BE IN ATTENDANCE UPON THE
VIEWING BY THE JURY OF THE CRIME SCENE.
•'

••

•

.

•..:
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During the course of trial in the instant matter, counsel for the
defendant moved the trial court to permit the jury to view the crime scene.
The trial court took the matter under advisement. (Tr. 266.) At a later ,
juncture, subsequent to both parties having rested their respective cases,
defendant's counsel renewed the motion to view the crime scene. The
motion was granted by the court with the proviso that neither the defendant
nor counsel for the defendant nor any other persons other than the jurors
and the deputies who accompanied them could be in attendance upon the
viewing. Defendant's counsel duly excepted to the court's ruling upon
grounds that the viewing of the crime scene was a critical stage of the
prosecution and, therefore, defendant, counsel, and other court personnel
should be in attendance. (Tr| 434-435.)
It is well established as a matter of law that trial courts possess
the discretionary power to grant a view of the premises constituting the
locus of a crime. Such proposition is so well established as to be beyond
all dispute, as shown in the following cases: Schoenfield v. United States,
277 F. 934 (2d Cir., 1921), cert, denied 258 U.S. 623, 66 L.Ed. 796, 42
S.Ct. 316 (1922); Massenberg v. United States, 19 F.2d62 (4th Cir., 1927);
Brown v. State, 229 Ala. 58, 755 So. 358 (1934); Bates v. State, 24 Ala.
App. 606, 139 So. 879 (1932); People v. Thorn, 156 N.Y. 286, 50 N. E. 947
(1898); Starr v. State, 5 Akla. Crim. Rep. 440, 115 P. 356 (1911). See also,
Roberts v. Commonwealth, 94 Ky.L.Rep. 2207, 80 S. W. 457 (1893); Young
v. Commonwealth, 141 Ky. 708, 133 S. W. 791 (1911); State v. Dunn, 161 La.
:

.

:

'

'
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•
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'
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532,

109 So. 56 (1926); State v. Seal, 175 La. 103, 143 So. 18 (1932); 75

Am.Jur.2d, Trials, § 72 et. seq.; 21 Am.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 295
et. seq.; 124 A.L.R. 141.
In Starr v. State, supra, the Oklahoma Supreme Court clearly ,.'
enunciated the basic principle to be applied by a trial court considering a
motion for viewing of the crime scene. Li its decision the court said:
When requested by the state or the defendant,
it is the common practice in the courts of this
country to permit the jury to visit and view the
premises where it is alleged the crime was
committed, when in the discretion of the court
a view is deemed expedient to enable the jury
to better understand and apply the evidence
presented in court. (115 P. at 366.)
Similarly, in People v. Thorn, supra, involving a prosecution for
murder, the New York Supreme Court held that the granting or refusing of
a view by the jury of the place where the crime was charged to have been
committed was within the discretion of the trial court under a statute
providing for such view when in the opinion of the court it is necessary to
assist the jury in understanding the facts of the case.
In its opinion, the court tersely encapsulated the applicable rule;
(It is) . . . discretionary with the trial judge
as to whether the view should be had . . .
(50N.E. at 951.)
•;•'•'••>•'
From the above cases and authority, it should be immediately
apparent that a viewing of the crime scene is properly permitted at the
trial court's discretion when such viewing is deemed expedient by the court
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

to enable the jury to better understand and apply the evidence presented to
the court. Thus, there can be no dispute here regarding the authority of
the trial court, at its discretion, to grant a viewing of the crime scene by
the jury.

In this case, the nub issue then is not the trial court f s authority

to grant such motion, but whether the manner in which the court exercised
such authority in this particular instance deprived defendant of substantial
rights by denying his opportunity and right to be present at such viewing.
There is substantial authority for the proposition that a defendant
in a criminal case must and should be accorded an opportunity, once the
trial court has exercised its discretionary power to permit a viewing of
the crime scene, to accompany the jurors and necessary court personnel
to the scene and participate with them in said viewing. Pierce v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 635, 115 S. E. 686 (1923); State v. Garden, 267 Minn. 97,
128 N.W.2d 891 (,

); People v. Auerbach, 176 Mich. 23, 141 N.W. 869

(1913); State v. Hartley, 22 Nev. 342, 40 P. 372 (1895); State v. Slorah,
118 Me. 203, 106 A. 768 (1919); Freeman v. Commonwealth, 226 Ky. 850,
10 S.W.2d 827 (1928); State v, Saunders, 268 Mo. 202 (
Commonwealth, 138 Va.

); Noell v.

, 115 S.E. 679 (1923). See also, Carver v.

Commonwealth, 256 S.W. 2d 375 (1953).
In Freeman v. Commonwealth, supra, the Court of Appeals for
Kentucky had before it the issue of whether a defendant in a criminal case
had a right to be present on the occasion of a viewing by the jury of the
scene of a homicide* The court concluded that, indeed, a defendant does
, :
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter
. ' !Law
• • • • Library,
- 1 0 J.
- Reuben
. • • Clark
V - , ;Law
^ y ,School,
; ; / , - .BYU.
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..• ""••'

possess such right, and particularly in a homicide case where, as in the;
instant case, counsel had vigorously objected to defendant's absence at
the time of the viewing. In its decision, the court said:

, ";•'"••;'

The jury was allowed to view the premises !,
where the homicide was committed in the
r
absence of appellant. This appears in an
order properly entered which shows the ' ;
'
objection of the appellant. The order also
shows that appellant was absent when the
premises were first viewed by the jury.
'
It has been held that the viewing of the
premises is the receiving of evidence,
and that it is error to allow the jury to
view the premises in the absence of the
accused. (10 S.W.2d at 827.)
Similarly, in Pierce v. Commonwealth, supra, the Court of Appeals
for Virginia had before it the identical issue of whether the defendant in a
homicide prosecution has a right to be present on the occasion of the
viewing by the jury of the crime scene. In affirmatively answering the
proposition, Justice West observed:
A conviction either of manslaughter or of
murder in the second degree would be
affirmed but for this fact which is disclosed
by the record: The jury were permitted to
view the premises while the accused remained
in the courtroom. In the judgment of the
other members of the court, and for the reasons
fully stated in the opinion in the case of Noell v.
Commonwealth (Va.) 115 S. E. 679, this day
handed down, this was error, because the
presence of the accused at the view was essential
to the validity of the conviction. (115 S. E. at 692.)
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,

,,
•

for Virginia fully sets forth the rationale behind the rule that a defendant
is entitled to be present on the occasion of the viewing by the jury of the
locus of the crime charged.

In its opinion, the court states:

The next inquiry to be disposed of is this:
When a view is ordered in a felony case, does
the prisoner always have the right to accompany the jury if he so desires? The answer,
by what appears to be a clear majority of the
decided cases, is in the affirmative. In 16
Corpus Juris, p. 816, the text says:

.

v

'••"It is generally held that the defendant is
entitled to be present when the jury are
taken to view the place of the crime, on the :•
ground that this is the taking of evidence and
a part of the trial, f f
and a number of cases are cited in support of
this statement.
In Starr v. State, 5 Okl. Cr. 440, 115 P.
356, the court says that - "It. would be better and safer for him to
accompany the jury, if convenient, to see
that nothing improper occurs at the view."
And it may be confidently asserted that the
authorities generally are in accord in holding
that the trial courts ought always to permit
the prisoner to attend if he so desires. As
said in State v. Slorah, 118 Me. 203, 106
Atl. 758, 4 A . L . R . 1256:
' ;
"The right of the accused to be present,
* * * if he demands it, is very generally
••"• recognized as inherent under a proper
consideration of the rights of the respondent in a criminal case. "' (115 S. E. at 681.)
-12Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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,

' '

Applying the rationale of the above cited cases and authority to
the facts in the instant case, it is clear that the appellant herein was
deprived by the ruling of the trial court of his right to be present on the ,
occasion ot the jury's visit to the crime scene. It is submitted that such
ruling deprived defendant of his right to monitor the viewing so as to
prevent improper or inappropriate conduct on the part of the jurors or
others. It is further submitted that such ruling deprived defendant of his
right to be present when evidence was taken and of his right to be present
at all critical stages of his prosecution. This court should reverse the
ruling of the trial court and remand this matter to the court below for a
new trial. .

'

.

'•/,"' .',• .
P O I N T

ii

;;••;'

•;'.:'•

/•• ••'.''.'•.'•'

..••'•'•: : : ;

•'•'.''"•':•;'

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INTERRUPTING DEFENSE
COUNSEL'S SUMMATION TO REMARK TO THE JURY
THAT APPELLANT COULD NOT PROPERLY CLAIM THE
DEFENSE OF SELF-DEFENSE IN A SITUATION WHERE
APPELLANT HAD SOUGHT OUT INDIVIDUALS WHO
EARLIER HAD ASSAULTED HIM.

,

In the course of defense counsel's summation, counsel directed the
jury's attention to the fact that, prior to the shootout at the Beehive Elk's
Lodge, the other individuals involved, the decedent David Allen Gray and •
one "Blood, " had assaulted the appellant and a companion with a rifle. At
that juncture, counsel was attempting to point out to the jury that even
though appellant had sought out the individuals who earlier assaulted him,
v

•

••

•

'•

-

1

3

-

'

•'•/

• ' . ' •

'

' • " . " •
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.
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the defendant acted in self-defense in so doing in response to an earlier
incident in which appellant's life had been placed in jeopardy. Counsel
was further attempting to point out that since the other individuals had
previously assaulted appellant, it was likely that they and not appellant
had fired the first shots at the Beehive Elk f s Lodge and that defendant had
returned their fire in self-defense.

,

MR. HANSEN:
. . . It's undisputed, there isn't
one witness that disputes that the first shooting
involved in this couple of days' spree was with a
rifle by Gray and Blood at Sonny Scott in the alley
behind the Elk's Club, the one who first does it,
and that was in the alley Saturday night, and with
their way of life -, THE COURT:
Mr. Hansen, I am going to have
to interrupt you.
MR.HANSEN:

That's fine.

THE COURT:
The aggressor is determined at
the time that the self-defense is claimed, not by
prior acts, although prior acts may have an
influence on what occurred at the time. You may
proceed. I'm sorry to interrupt you.
MR. HANSEN:
THE COURT:
MR. HANSEN:
(Tr. 488-489.)

;

May I note my exception to that?
You may.
Thank you.
^

.'•'-••••/r^'''-'

\ '', /

The extent to which the above reported colloquy confused and
misled the jury may be seen at a later juncture when the jury, subsequent
-14Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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to the giving of the court's instructions and subsequent to several hours of
deliberation, returned to the court and requested clarification on the issue
of how far and to what extent an individual can go in pursuing another
individual in the exercise of his right to self-defense: ,
i

'

'

,,

'

•

•

'

•

•

.

COURT:
The record may show that the jury
has come back into the courtroom, it's my
understanding that you have another question,
is that correct Mr. Foreman?
FOREMAN:
COURT:
situation?

Yes, that's correct.

'

And does that refer to any fact

FOREMAN: , This is a specific question
with respect to the law.

;-

COURT:
All right, before we take your '
second -- well, tell us what your second
problem is, what is that with reference to?
FOREMAN:
COURT:
FOREMAN:

\

The same section.
Same set?
Yes, that's correct.

COURT:
All right, I'll allow you to state
what the problem is and what doesn't appear
to be clear.
FOREMAN:
Well, basically the question is,
I suppose, under the law -COURT:
Let me put it to you this way, I
don't want argument or to know how you're
trying to go, but if you can just put it in a
, way that will tell me your problem.
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FOREMAN:
COURT:
..

c

'•.••

a

n

I'm not sure that I can.
Well, just do the best you

'

•

,'

•

. ' . ; ' . . • , ' •

FOREMAN:
How far can a man go in
pursuing someone under the law, under
.the guise of self-defense. That is,
basically, is a man justified under the
^rules of self-defense to go after the man
'

•

,
'

,

'

,

o

r

"

"

'

"

.

' ' ' • •

' '

',

. ' • • •

. '

' COURT:
I think I see your problem.
Let me see if I see it correctly. Well,
is that the second question you had to
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From the above it should be readily apparent that the effect of the
trial court's earlier remarks in interrupting counsel's summation was to
confuse the jury as to whether or not, ip the exercise of his right and
privilege of self-defense, the defendant was justified in pursuing the
original assailants and seeking them out. The court's remarks constituted,
as it were, an additional instruction to the jury to the effect that appellant
could not so act consistent with his right of self-defense. As a result, such
remarks improperly prejudiced appellant's right to present his defense
to the jury and such remarks, therefore, were reversible error.
It is clearly established as a matter of law that the defense of
self-defense is available to an individual even though the individual acts
affirmatively in response to an act or threat on the part of another and
even though that act or threat is removed in time and circumstance from
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the fatal encounter that results, so long as the acts of self-defense involved
are so closely connected with the original difficulty in time and circumstances
as to be fairly regarded as having been brought on by the original difficulty.
State v. Lee, 85 S.C. 101, 67 S.E. 141 (1910); 40 Am.Jur.2d, Homicide,
§ 145. As a correlary, one may go so far in the exercise of his right of
self-defense as to seek out the adversary or original assailant and arm
oneself precedent to doing so. Jones v. Commonwealth, 187 Va. 133, 45
S. E.2d 908 (1948); State v. Feeley, 194 Mo. 300, 92 S. W. 663 (1906);
State v. Jackson, 94 Ariz. 117, 382 P.2d 229 (1963); State v. Doris, 51 Or.
136, 94 P. 44 (1908); Gray v. State, 55 Tex. Crim. 90, 114 S.W. 635 (1908);
Beard v. State, 47 Tex. Crim. 50, 81 S.W. 33 (1904); State v. Flory, 40
Wyo. 184, 276P. 458 (1929); Bonnard v. State, 25 Tex. App. 173, 7 S.W.
862 (1888); and King v. State, 51 Tex. Crim. 208, 101 S.W. 237 (1907).
Am.Jur.2d, Homicide, § 145, states part of the above set forth
rule as follows:

j

The fault . . . is not confined to the precise ,
time of the fatal encounter which results,
but may include a fault so closely connected
with the difficulty in time or circumstance
as to be fairly regarded as operating to
,
bring it on.

;

In State v. Lee, supra, the South Carolina Supreme Court had
before it the issue of whether the trial court erred in refusing to charge
the jury that the "fault, " for the purpose of determining the viability of
a defense of self-defense, must be at the time of the fatal encounter and
.•••'•
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not at some previous time. In ruling that such charge would have been
improper and unduly restrictive, the Supreme Court said:
The third exception assigns error in refusing
to charge the defendant's seventh request as
follows: "Fault in bringing on a difficulty
so as to deprive one of the right of self-defense
must be a fault at the time of the fatal encounter,
and not a fault at some previous time. t f The
court refused to charge in that language. The
instruction requested was inaccurate and misleading in restricting the fault in bringing on
the difficulty to the precise time of the fatal
encounter and in excluding from consideration
fault, which, although not occurring at the
precise time of the difficulty, but previously,
may have been so closely connected with the
difficulty in time and circumstances as to be
fairly regarded as operating to bring it on.
(67S.E. at 142.)

t

<

; .

Applying the above quoted rule and the reasoning of the above
cited cases to the facts in this case, it is clear that the defense of selfdefense would be available to the defendant Galveston Sonny Scott in this
case even though he was acting affirmatively in seeking out the individuals
I
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who had earlier assaulted him and even though he armed himself precedent
to doing so. This is the case since the acts of the decedent and MBloodtf
in assaulting defendant with weapons on the preceding Saturday were so
closely related in time and circumstances to the later encounter at the ,
Beehive Elk's Lodge as to be fairly regarded as having brought on such
encounter. Since this is so, counsel for the defendant had a right and,
indeed, a duty to present to the jury in his summation his theory that the
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decedent Gray and his companion "Blood were the original aggressors
and that defendant had acted in self-defense in seeking them out. The
court, by its ruling, effectively precluded presentation of such theory
and thereby foreclosed to defendant one of his alternative defenses.
From the above it should be obvious that the defendant-appellant
was entitled to rely upon the defense of self-defense, that he was entitled
to call the jury's attention to the fact that the other individuals were the
original aggressors, and that their aggression was not sufficiently removed
in time and circumstance for the defense of self-defense to be unavailable
to appellant even though he sought them out subsequent to the initial
encounter and even though he armed himself precedent to doing so. As
a result, the trial court's remarks were misleading and prejudicial and
clearly constitute reversible error 0 This court should reverse the conviction of defendant-appellant and remand the matter for a i^ew trial.
|

CONCLUSION

- '

The trial court erred in ruling that neither defendant, his counsel,
nor necessary court personnel could be in attendance upon the viewing by
the jury of the crime scene. Further, the trial court erred in interrupting
defense counsel's summation to remark to the jury that appellant could not
properly claim the defense of self-defense in a situation where appellant
had sought out individuals who earlier had assaulted him. This court
should reverse the verdict and judgment of the trial court and remand ^
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the matter for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
PHIL L. HANSEN AND ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for the Appellant
250 East Broadway, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

By
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Phil L. Hansen
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